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Distributing Systems Level Leadership to Address the COVID-19 Pandemic 
 
Introduction 
The coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic has disrupted the political, economic and health care 
systems of most, if not all countries across the globe. As such, the COVID-19 pandemic 
represents another global health catastrophe similar to the Spanish flu (1918-1920), H1N1 
swine flu (2009-2010) and West African Ebola (2014-2016) with high mortalities. Current 
public health measures aimed at subduing the spread of COVID-19 virus seem to be working 
but are not extensive enough to prevent ongoing infections and death. [1] There is a need for 
leadership at the systems level, necessary because COVID-19 represents a complex problem, 
of a type commonly characterised as VUCA (volatile, uncertain, complex ambiguous) unlikely 
to be effectively addressed by a single agency or person. [2] In the context of COVID-19, 
leadership of the system encompasses politicians, scientific experts, civil servants and 
frontline practitioners, where leadership is shaped by the system in which it is enacted, and 
its historical, political and national characteristics. [3][4] We discuss systems level leadership 
to address the COVID-19 outbreak [5][6][7], with concern for recovering from COVID-19.  
 
As our first aim, we outline three themes related to how systems level leadership might 
influence recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic.Second, we provide comparative 
international descriptors that we critically evaluate against these three systems level 
leadership themes. We draw upon observations of the way systems level leadership is 
enacted across England, Australia, India, and in the Caribbean (Aruba), thus drawing upon 
lessons from both OECD nations and low-medium income countries (LMICs), and small as well 
as large countries, in our analysis. Following which, in our conclusion, we set out prescriptions 
for systems level leadership in the context of considerable volatility, uncertainty, complexity 
and ambiguity (VUCA). [2] 
 
Theoretical Insight 
As our first theme, to understand prospects for recovery, we need to examine preparation 
pre-crisis. In the preparation phase, while organisations and their leaders are faced with the 
intractable problem of planning for the unexpected they must overcome any tendency to feel 
a crisis will not happen to them. Preparatory work by leaders for a pandemic might include 
development of physical and social infrastructure, establishing monitoring and surveillance 
systems, emergency action plans, medical systems and other capacities. Lack of resource 
stymies leadership capacity for the necessary recovery from crises, nurtures the blame game 
and is likely to render learning following the crisis more challenging. [8] 
 
Second, we highlight debate about the most effective leadership configurations for 
addressing and recovering from COVID-19. Conceptions of leadership appropriate to address 
a crisis such as that presented by COVID-19, on the one hand, highlight the need for heroic 
individualistic leadership [9]. Indeed, we have seen heroic leaders emerge in the political 
domain (Jacinta Ardern, New Zealand’s Prime Minister), amongst scientific experts (Chris 
Whitty, Chief Medical Officer, United Kingdom), and the clinical frontline: see James Stoller’s 
account of such hero leaders at the Cleveland Clinic in the US where he works in a previous 
issue of British Medical Journal Leader. [10] Such individualistic leadership is necessary to 
respond to the immediate crisis engendered by COVID-19, but contemporary leadership 
studies alert us to the need to complement this with distributing leadership at a systems level 
as we move through to a phase of recovery from such crises. [11][12] A complex issue such 
as a flu pandemic involves a large number of agencies, all of whom encompass discrete 
professional and organisational expert jurisdictions. We thus argue post-heroic leadership 
alternatives that go beyond a single, ‘heroic’ individual are needed to manage the crisis since 
we need to combine knowledge capabilities of a myriad of actors. This is not merely a case of 
having a myriad of leaders ‘around the table’, but ensuring their leadership efforts are not 
fragmented, rather they share the same values and their influence is synergistic and aligned 
in addressing COVID-19. [13] 
 
Finally, the initial affective leadership response to any crisis is likely to impact upon the ability 
of any system to develop and maintain the necessary productive interactions underpinning 
effective leadership for recovery. During the early stages of any crisis leaders commonly 
distance themselves from responsibility for the crisis and exhibit defensiveness regarding any 
attribution for failure. [14] As such, the unintended consequence of blame can entrap people 
into established behavioural commitments and make it more difficult to recover from crisis 
on the basis that blame and paralysis works against collective learning, as it reduces trust, 
openness to information, and communication [15].  
 
We now consider the three themes raised in literature about systems level leadership through 
illustrations across our four countries, analysis of which we derived from their respected 
national media; e.g. in case of England, we reviewed headlines from BBC News, the Guardian, 
and Financial Times. In essence, literature suggests a need for leadership to be pluralised, 
even as heroic leaders come to the fore, and for leadership to be pointing in the same 






Statistics: Using statistics produced by John Hopkins University on March 15th 2021, for 
comparison purposes (www.coronavirus.jhu.edu) there have been 4.23million cases and 
125,000 deaths in the United Kingdom, of which England represents the major constituent 
(UK population is 68 million, of which England is 55.3 million). John Hopkins University notes 
that statistics may be collected in different ways by countries, with considerable under-
reporting in some countries, nevertheless international commentary highlights England has 
performed poorly relative to other countries. 
 
Preparation for COVID-19: In England, the government  was slow into lockdown, lagging some 
weeks behind its European neighbours, even as COVID-19 in the population became 
increasingly evident. The  government appeared complacent. We note, for instance, Prof John 
Ashton, a leading Public Health expert, branded England’s  COVID-19 response “pathetic … 
they’ve been doing it in a (non) smoke-filled room and just dribbling out stuff.” (The Guardian, 
12 March).  Such complacency  was reflected in the Prime Minister missing a total of five 
Cobra meetings (Government’s main emergency committee) at the start of the outbreak. The 
Government’s initial stance, although since denied, was one of encouraging ‘herd immunity’ 
through accepting large swathes of the population would become ill (Financial Times, 9 
March). The economic imperative was dominant even in the early days of COVID-19, 
encouraged by more libertarian Ministers, seemingly at odds with others in the Government, 
such as the Health Minister. Following which, England lacked surveillance infrastructure for 
COVID-19, perhaps more crucially it lacked supplies of testing equipment and personal 
protection equipment for frontline professionals. The high death rate in England, in part is 
due to poor preparation, and likely to render recovery following the crisis more challenging 
than it might otherwise have been. As evident below, poor preparation fuelled allegations of 
blame and defensiveness across the ranks of leaders in different domains that might be 
expected to come together in response to COVID-19.   
 
Individualistic and distributed leadership configuration: In the context of poor preparation 
outlined above, the Prime Minister, Boris Johnson aligned his role as one of a ‘wartime’ leader 
akin to Churchill, a Prime Minister regarded as hero by the English public. Following which, 
and despite poor preparation, an encouraging  collective trajectory of leadership emerged. 
Alongside his inclusion of key Ministers concerned with the economy and health, we also note 
inclusion of scientific experts in the leadership configuration in daily media briefings about 
COVID-19 alongside the Prime Minister. We see the Government rely upon a narrower range 
of knowledge capabilities than might be optimal, with evidence produced by epidemiologists 
and statistical modellers privileged, and to some extent behavioural scientists. Further, 
despite problems of supply chains for personal protective equipment and the challenge of 
mounting an effective operational response at organisational level to the delivery of health 
and social care, there is an absence of those frontline leaders with organisation and 
management expertise. Rather, the Government took a centralised, command-and-control 
approach, which might be characterised as symbolic to show they are doing something to 
address COVID-19. Large scale exhibition centres were converted into temporary 
‘Nightingale’  hospitals. When the crisis subsided with COVID-19 numbers dropping, and 
lockdown restrictions much reduced, this potentially allowed space for reflection and learning 
regarding  the effectiveness of collective leadership in anticipation of the much predicted 
second wave of the pandemic. However, first, the Prime Minister pushed back against an 
imminent inquiry. Second, central government, despite calls for greater involvement of 
regional and local leaders in decision-making, did not extend the leadership collective. This 
was apparent in the government mandating a local lockdown in June in a city in the English 
Midlands, Leicester, within which local health and political leaders were both surprised by the 
lockdown and starved of the nationally held data they needed to control infections. The 
leadership fractures between central government and local government were even greater 
as a second lockdown extended later in the year on a regional basis. Even within the 
Government, so-called ‘hawks’ in the ruling party, who wanted the economy opened up, were 
at odds with the Prime Minister’s decision-making around lockdown. Rather than distributed, 
leadership can be characterised as fragmented at the second lockdown stage. Only during a 
third lockdown, which was implemented on a national basis, did leadership appear more 
distributed, with consensus within Government and between central and local government, 
in the face of increasing incidence of COVID-19 and visible pressure on the NHS and their staff 
with increasing hospitalisations. Following which, the Government worked closely with NHS 
and public health organisations to ensure,  along with Israel, England has been one of the fast 
movers in vaccinations, with 23.34 million of the population vaccinated by 15th March 2021, 
and all adults expected to have received at least their first dose of a the vaccination by end 
June 2021. 
 
Affective leadership response to COVID-19: The promise of an emerging collective leadership 
configuration across different actors and levels of the system has dissipated. Beginnings of 
blame were evident in England in the immediate aftermath of emergence of COVID-19. 
Anthony Costello, former Director of Maternal and Child Health at the World Health 
Organisation (WHO) has been particularly critical of the English Government’s response as ‘a 
litany of failures’ (The Guardian, 7 April). Worryingly, rather than reflect and learn during the 
space afforded later on by the summer within which case numbers fell, the Government 
showed its disposition towards blaming scientific experts for poor advice. Meanwhile, the 
scientific experts claimed the government didn’t follow the experts. This was starkly evident 
when the Prime Minister demanded employees return to work, but the government’s chief 
scientific advisor refuted the idea and emphasised employees should work from home when 
they could. The Government also blamed other agencies for failure to effectively address the 
COVID-19 pandemic. Public Health England in particular was castigated for failure. 
Meanwhile, the head of the civil service, Mark Sedwell, was ‘stood down’ by the Prime 
Minister, influenced by his private chief advisor, Dominic Cummings, that the civil service 
proved weak in responding to the COVID-19 pandemic. While, supported by a rapid mass 
vaccination programme, England appears to be coming out of the pandemic quicker than 
many other nations, should there be a public inquiry (the Prime Minister has suggested there 
will be given time), then there is likely to be blame as well as learning derived from this.  
 
Summary: In England, while the inclusion of scientific leaders to address volatility and 
uncertainty of COVID-19 is praiseworthy, given leadership fragmentation, a prevalence of 
scapegoating from some of the leadership configuration, and poor leadership preparation for 
a pandemic, the configuration for leadership appeared to not be effectively distributed to 
frame the response to COVID-19 in England as well as might be desirable. While the rapid 
mass vaccination programme appears to underpin a recovery trajectory, in the face of COVID-
19 incidence numbers and associated deaths, we suggest enactment of distributed leadership 




Statistics: According to the Johns Hopkins Coronavirus Resource Centre, on March 15th 2021, 
India, a low middle income country of around 1.3 billion people, has the second-highest 
number of coronavirus cases (after the United States), with 11.26 million cases and 158,063 
deaths (less than 2 percent).  However, due to India's poor health monitoring system, there 
could be significant under-reporting of this data. Nonetheless, it appears that India 
outperformed several developed countries, including the United States, in terms of COVID-
19 management.   
 
Preparation for COVID-19: Capacity issues, lack of collaborative leadership, and operational 
feasibility have been to blame for poor preparation to manage COVID-19.   The pandemic has 
highlighted the flaws and shortcomings of India 's response in terms of low testing rates, 
inadequate healthcare services, and deficient social security. Supplies of necessary 
equipment, such as PPEs, were not provided in a timely way, and as the epidemic progressed, 
shortages arose rapidly. Other services, such as hospital beds, ventilators, were also way 
below the requirements. The main purpose of the lockdown was to buy time for making 
preparations to deal with the pandemic effectively post-lockdown through deployment of 
public health personnel; increasing the testing capacity; establishing a consistent strategy for 
tracing and quarantining contacts; and maintaining the treatment and protection of patients 
across critical facilities. However, there emerged criticism that central government thwarted 
or made the efforts of state governments more complicated in absence of synergistic 
leadership to address the pandemic. 
 
Individualistic and distributed leadership configuration: That India implemented a nationwide 
lockdown without meticulous planning and transparency fits with the highly personalised 
leadership style of the Prime Minister Modi. Nevertheless, the early phase of India’s response 
to the emergence of COVID-19 was enacted through a collective leadership configuration 
across a high level Group of Ministers (similar to emergency committee, Cobra, in England) 
comprising of central government ministers of Health, Civil Aviation, External Affairs, 
Defence, and Home Affairs to review, monitor and evaluate the preparedness regarding 
management of COVID-19 in the country (www.pib.gov.in). Below this sat groups empowered 
to advise about discrete issues, such as supply chains and public communications. These were 
coordinated by the Ministry of Home Affairs. Guidelines were issued to all 37 states and union 
territories on management of COVID-19 and progress was regularly reviewed through video 
conferencing by high-level government officials. District Collectors were designated as the 
‘nodal officers’ at field level for containment operations, who were given adequate authority 
to take the critical decisions in coordination with respective state governments. Meanwhile, 
scientific experts were involved in briefings through electronic and social media. Initially, 
there was little conflict in the leadership efforts of scientists and the central government, in 
large part because the former were drawn from central government funded and controlled 
institutions, such as  Indian Council of Medical Research, All India Institute of Medical 
Sciences, National Institute of Virology. India appeared to enact the necessary collective 
leadership for an effective response to COVID-19, nevertheless cracks in leadership were to 
appear as setout in the next section. 
 
On January 16, 2021 India launched the world's largest vaccination campaign against the 
COVID-19, vaccinating about 300 million people in priority categories. To date, however, just 
0.3 percent of the population has been completely vaccinated. The first group consisted of 
healthcare and frontline staff, while the second group consisted of people over 60 years and 
those aged 45 to 59 who had comorbid conditions. This second group began receiving 
vaccinations from March 1, 2021. The Ministry of Health set up more than 20,000 vaccination 
sites across the country, and launched a dedicated website (cowin.gov.in) and CoWin app for 
registration. Surprisingly, India offers free vaccination at government hospitals and has set a 
price limit of Rs.500 (US$7) for two doses at private hospitals. The Ministry also drafted a 
"COVID-19 Vaccine Communication Strategy" to ensure the success of the vaccination 
programme, and is now working closely with public and private health organisations, 
individual influencers, community groups, and social media. Like England, the vaccination 
programme appears underpinned by more effective distribution of leadership than previously 
evident. 
 
Affective leadership response to COVID-19: We see evidence of conflict, specifically between 
central (‘union’) government and individual state governments, which adversely affected 
attempts to curb the pandemic. The Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) constituted an Inter-
State Ministerial Team (ISMT) to inspect states, such as Kerala, that were potentially diverging 
from national lockdown. Conflict was evident with West Bengal, where state government 
failed to provide ISMT with sufficient data about patterns of COVID-19. Following which, the 
Chief Minister of West Bengal blamed central government for taking unilateral and 
undesirable actions against some state governments. In Delhi, the state government accused 
the central government of issuing home isolation rules alleging that it was not an 
epidemiological decision, but a political one, highlighting inconsistency over quarantine rules 
applying in the city. Meanwhile, central government accused Delhi-based state government 
of generating terror in the city through over-estimation of numbers of cases of COVID-19, 
which had an adverse economic impact upon the city and its region. We also see conflict 
emerging between scientific experts and central government. In May 2020, three medical 
professional bodies sent a joint statement to Prime Minister Modi criticising the handling of 
the COVID-19 outbreak, highlighting lack of consultation by central government with 
epidemiologists who had a greater knowledge of the nature of disease transmission relative 
to experts in statistical modelling whose views seemed privileged. Blame across different 
levels of government and between government and scientific experts seemed increasingly 
prevalent in India as numbers of COVID-19 climbed.  
 
Summary: In India we see an antecedent configuration of individualistic and distributed 
leadership across the system. Vaccinating a billion people, including hundreds of millions of 
adults, against COVID-19 would be a daunting and unparalleled challenge in India, and it will 
take at least a couple of years to reach half of the population.  Health practitioners are more 
likely to help with recovery, but a lack of coordination between the central and state agencies 
has weakened India's chances of learning and recovering from the pandemic. It appears that 
the implementation of distributed leadership in Indian health system has only been 
moderately effective in COVID-19 response.  
 
Australia 
Statistics: On March 15th 2021, John Hopkins Coronavirus Resource Centre reports 29,074 
cases and 909 deaths from COVID-19 in Australia having a total population of nearly 27.8 
million. Of the the total number of deaths, 820 (90.2%) were in the state of Victoria 
(population just under 6.7 million), primarily in the city of Melbourne and amongst older 
Australians living in residential care homes.  There have been no deaths from COVID-19 in 
Australia since mid-October 2020. 
 
Preparation for COVID-19: The lessons learnt from a recent Royal Commission into natural 
disaster arrangements is likely valuable for future planning and preparedness for crisis such 
as health pandemics. The 2019-2020 summer bushfires had a devastating impact on human 
life, property and wild life. The Royal Commission examined Australia’s readiness for and 
response to all natural disasters. It made 80 recommendations, including improved 
coordination amongst all levels of governments during emergencies, with central (‘federal’) 
government taking a leading role in co-ordinating responses by state and territory 
governments.  
 
Following which, all states and territories responded rapidly in putting in place a system for 
COVID-19 testing and tracking, encouraging citizens to take a test at their local testing centre 
(typically within a few kilometres from their home). Each state/territory acted quickly to 
mobilise staff in their local Department of Health to provide the necessary supplies of PPE, 
ventilators and other equipment. A case in example is the state of Victoria where the 
Department of Health and Human Services worked closely with one large healthcare provider 
to build and operate a highly efficient distribution centre providing warehousing and logistics 
services to a number of other healthcare service providers across the state.    
 
Individualistic and distributed leadership configuration: When considering COVID-19, its’ first 
and second waves paint a contrasting picture of the handling of this pandemic in Australia 
and characteristics of individualistic and distributed leadership. The initial response by the 
federal government and the state/territory governments was swift and appeared highly 
effective. A National Incident Room was activated on 20 January 2020 by the Prime Minister, 
Scott Morrison, who very quickly established the National Cabinet that included the state 
premiers and chief ministers of the territories, which might be viewed as similar to England’s 
emergency committee, Cobra. The Australian Health Protection Principle Committee 
(AHPCC), composed of scientific experts, held its first meeting on 30 January, chaired by the 
federal Chief Medical Officer (CMO) that included CMOs of every state and territory. The State 
of Victoria, as with other states and territories, also established a special cabinet, namely the 
Coronavirus Crisis Cabinet. Each jurisdiction developed its own response with rapid 
implementation. During the first wave, supported by the federal government, there was good 
coordination of leadership response by the states and territories (each supported by their 
own Chief Medical Officers - CMOs and Health Ministers). Individualistic and distributed 
leadership was clearly visible. In contrast, during the second wave, we note states and 
territories responding independently, as each state/territory imposed their own restrictions 
and border closures, following which fragmentation of efforts emerged between the federal 
government and the state/territory governments, as well as amongst the leaders of the 
states/territories. This highlights the fact that individual and distributed leadership is a 
dynamic phenomenon and fragmentation across jurisdictions can dilute system level 
leadership.    
 
Affective leadership response to COVID-19: The first wave reached its peak just before the end 
of March 2020 and during the second half of April, there were only a handful of infections 
reported daily. It seemed that Australia had successfully handled COVID-19, with just over 
one hundred deaths reported nationally. However, not everything seemed to have worked 
well. The Ruby Princess cruise ship was allowed to dock in Sydney and resulted in over one 
hundred infections on Australian soil and in other countries when passengers were allowed 
to board flights to return to their homes overseas. This has highlighted the breakdown of 
communication amongst the various authorities involved, leading to an official government 
inquiry being held into this incident. Another incident that essentially led to the second, more 
severe, wave of COVID-19 infections in the state of Victoria resulted from the hotel 
quarantine debacle in Melbourne. Starting in April 2020, hundreds of visitors returning from 
overseas were put into quarantine across a number of hotels. The security measures put in 
place (having multiple security guards at each hotel) were not directly handled by the state 
government but essentially handed over to a few security firms who then subcontracted to 
others to find the necessary staff, resulting in them failing to do their job effectively. It took a 
number of weeks before the state government stepped in to take more drastic action, 
bringing in the state police and the Australian Defence Force personnel. Following which, the 
second wave started to appear in mid-June 2020, with the number of daily infections quickly 
rising to well beyond the peak reached in the first wave. The state government put in place 
aggressive suppression measures, introducing stage 4 lockdown in Melbourne and stage 3 
lockdown in regional Victoria. By mid-October 2020, the number of daily infections reported 
reduced to very small numbers, leading to reducing the restrictions significantly. There has 
been some disagreement and blame amongst the state and federal leaders to the extent of 
the measures being put in place in this respect and when the borders will be opened up, 
especially for Victorians. Following a small cluster of COVID-19 cases recorded at a hotel near 
Melbourne Airport in early February 2021, the Victorian government put in place a 5-day 
“circuit breaker” lockdown across the whole state.  This measure was considered essential 
and was highly effective in stopping the spread of the virus from the local area. Again, we see 
that Australia’s leadership response at the system level has proved responsive to emerging 
threats posed by COVID-19. 
 
Australia’s COVID-19 vaccination programme started in late February 2021 and will become 
available in phases. The Australian Government is being advised by the Australian Technical 
Advisory Group on Immunisation (ATAGI) and consistent with guidance from the World 
Health Organization, prioritisation of groups for the first dose has been carried out and 
vaccinations have began. Delays in the supplies of COVID vaccine, reliant upon a global supply 
chain, have illustrated, however, that leadership efforts may need to extend beyond a single 
nation’s system, and leadership requires distribution at a global level.  
 
Summary: In Australia, while antecedent conditions for effective leadership include 
preparation and synergy across levels of government, the volatility, uncertainty, 
complexity and ambiguity of COVID-19 means little room for error from leaders. Australian 
leaders seem to be learning in real-time, which might enhance prospects for recovery.  The 
state of Victoria demonstrates that although mistakes can be made (e.g. the poor handling 
of the hotel quarantines), a strong system-level leadership team aids an effective response 




Statistics: Not currently covered by John Hopkins University’s statistics as a separate nation, 
the island’s public website identifies 8110 cases and 77 deaths to date in a population of 
116,576. Currently there are 205 active  Covid-19 cases  and an estimated 10,561 inhabitants 
have received the first shot of the Pfizer Covid vaccine (data provided 7th  March 2021).  
 
Preparation for crisis: From a health care delivery perspective, specific leadership actions 
were taken in anticipation of the potential escalation of COVID-19 admissions to the island’s 
288 bed hospital.  These actions facilitated unique collaborative and learning opportunities. 
For example, due to the fragile nature of the island’s health care infrastructure, the Horacio 
Oduber Hospital (HOH) and ImSan as the primary health facilities on the island, quickly 
reached out to each other, took stock of their human and technical resources and crafted 
strategies to combine and utilise these resources efficiently. The HOH leadership set up a 
multidisciplinary outbreak management team (OMT) that liaised directly with the officials of 
the island’s department of public health. The OMT conducted daily briefings, informing and 
updating hospital staff about the developments using a central communication channel. The 
hospital co-opted intensive care clinicians into its efforts to address COVID-19, to facilitate 
fast track training sessions on COVID-19 mechanical ventilation for back up teams of non-
intensive care clinical personnel. The pandemic also highlighted the importance and need for 
compassionate and psychologically safe working environments in times of crisis. The impact 
of the pandemic on the psychological well-being of hospital employees catalysed the creation 
of a special task force to develop and implement a peer support network designed to offer 
formal and informal support to hospital employees, both in the short and long term.   
 
Individualistic and distributed leadership configuration: Aruba is a small island nation and 
configuring distributed leadership across the limited geography and number of actors might 
be less challenging, nevertheless there are lessons to be gleaned for smaller size countries. 
When the first COVID-19 case was reported in Aruba on 13 March, decisive measures were 
taken two days later to immediately close the island’s water and airspace to commercial 
transportation. Staged mitigatory measures followed including school closure, and lockdowns 
of bars, restaurants and commercial businesses. The Prime Minister of Aruba’s decision to 
pre-emptively shut the island to foreign traffic was seen as unequivocal and swift in response 
to the pandemic. There was also extensive collaboration between the Prime Minister’s 
Health, Justice and Finance Ministers as well as inputs from different scientific experts in a 
National Crisis Commission set up by the Government. These early measures established the 
antecedent conditions for subsequent recovery on the island.  In case of Aruba, we this see 
the type of individualistic leadership that the public might expect in crisis, but also this was 
enacted in parallel with leadership distributed across relevant ministerial areas and scientific 
experts.   
 
Affective Leadership Response to COVID-19: Coming out of the imposed lockdown, however, 
proved to be difficult. Caught within the conflicting tensions of a national health safety crisis, 
rising protests due to government-imposed movement restrictions and a de-stabilised 
tourism-dependent economy, the borders of Aruba were reopened to inbound travel on the 
10 June. It was not a decision that was embraced by all stakeholders, with particular concern 
about ending lockdown coming from healthcare providers. Aruba’s Government trod 
carefully and its’ decision to reopen borders was made in conjunction with its’ Department of 
Public Health (DPH) and in line with recommendations from the World Health Organization 
(WHO), The Dutch National Institute for Public Health and the Environment (RIVM) and 
Centers for Disease Control (CDC) in the United States.  A number of safety measures set up 
before discontinuing lockdown included heightened surveillance and local containment of the 
(spread of) the virus through aggressive identification and management of potential COVID-
19 cases, and the gradual easing of on-island restrictions based on the case-response effect 
of targeted measures aimed to reduce the number of COVID-19 cases. Stringent health 
standards and safety protocols, such as  the ‘Aruba Health & Happiness Code’, were also 
implemented island-wide, especially within the tourism and hospitality business. 
 
Summary: As a small resource limited nation, tension between economic and public health 
objectives in Aruba were exacerbated, with consequent potential to fragment leadership. 
Nevertheless, attention to global prescriptions to mediate uncertainty of COVID-19, and 
synergy and alignment between higher level leaders and those on the frontline of healthcare 
delivery contributed to recovery from COVID-19 in what is a tightly networked country. New 
challenges the island is facing, include the education of its inhabitants about the benefits of 
vaccination and the acquisition of sufficient vials to ensure optimal coverage of the island’s 
population. 
Conclusion: Comparative Lessons for Systems Leadership in Pandemic Times 
We highlight in a crisis situation, both in its immediate response and its influence upon 
recovery following the crisis, leadership is enacted within a situation of considerable volatility, 
uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity (VUCA). [2] Leaders are not sure what they are dealing 
with, and what they should focus upon in addressing the volatile crisis. Historical precedents 
are limited from which to draw learning to address a situation in which many variables 
interact in unpredictable ways. Outcomes and endpoints remain unclear. Yet data and 
insights must be gleaned in real time to drive discrete, manageable chunks of action. In 
essence, while our analysis aims to provide prescription for systems level leadership, much of 
what leaders do will be necessarily improvised in such a volatile, uncertain, complex and 
ambiguous context. The four nations we examine might be seen as similar, with respect to 
the trajectory of lockdowns and gradual release from lockdown. Yet, there are differing 
outcomes, and indeed the volatility and uncertainty of COVID-19 means we cannot assume, 
even with what appears effective leadership, recovery proceeds smoothly. India and Australia 
performed relatively well in the immediate aftermath of COVID-19, and despite the former 
coming in the category of low-medium income country with a huge population. However, the 
effectiveness of their systems leadership appears to have dipped, significantly in India’s case, 
thus inhibiting prospects for recovery. Further, Australia shows significant within country 
variation in its recovery from COVID-19, with Melbourne going back into lockdown in August 
2020, and then in February 2021. The key statistic of deaths per 100 thousand population 
reveals England as a poor performer in their systems leadership response to COVID-19. 
Finally, Aruba, like India and Australia managed the aftermath of the pandemic well, but due 
to its small scale, suffered an immediate economic backlash as its tourism-dependent 
economy collapsed. Our international comparative analysis highlights three leadership 
prescriptions that help us think through how systems level leadership might be configured 
over time to recover from COVID-19. 
 
Prescription 1 Preparation for crisis: Recovery is shaped by antecedent conditions, even prior 
to the emergence of COVID-19. Leadership around planning for unanticipated events is 
crucial, since lack of preparation for such events is likely to engender blame rather than a 
learning response towards recovery.  
 
Prescription 2 Individualistic and distributed leadership configuration: Notwithstanding the 
volatile and unpredictable nature of COVID-19, the leadership trajectory for recovery is one 
which requires a large number of stakeholders from discrete professional and organisational 
boundaries to be engaged in a leadership response over time. As such, leadership needs to 
be distributed across political, scientific and frontline clinical domains, with synergistic, rather 
than fragmented, momentum.  
 
Prescription 3 Affective Leadership Response to COVID-19: What should be avoided in such a 
volatile and unpredictable situation is blame and scapegoating. Governments may find it 
more difficult to engage leaders where they feel they ‘may be hung out to dry’ for failing to 
effectively address any crisis, and thus slow to contribute to recovery efforts. In this respect, 
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